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Abstract
There is a growing body of literature on the safe use of biotechnology and the need for an
international biosafety protocol and national regulations to facilitate the safe development and
transfer of biotechnology.  Most of these studies, however, address the issue of biosafety from a
scientific, legal, environmental and organizational perspective.  The purpose of this paper is to add
to this discussion by providing an economic perspective on regulating products of agricultural
biotechnology, with special emphasis on implications for developing countries who are under
increasing pressure to put a biosafety framework in place. The paper provides a brief discussion
on the economic rationale for biosafety regulations, explains the economic benefits and costs of
biosafety, and discusses the appropriate form of biosafety policy and the effects of regulation on
resource allocation.
The benefits of biosafety discussed include - the reduction of possible human and environmental
risks of biotechnology products and "accident" costs to the society; increased predictability for a
research organization of the expected time and money to get a new product on the market;
making the products of biotechnology accessible to a country; and the provision of certainty and
stability to the social framework, necessary for the development of biotechnology research and
development activities.  Developing countries should balance these potential benefits with the
tangible costs of biosafety regulation to the biotechnology organizations and the society.  To a
biotechnology organization, biosafety will increase the research lag, production costs, transaction
costs and marketing costs. Given the scarcity of human and physical resources, setting up a
biosafety system also poses opportunity costs to the society.
The following issues need careful examination in designing a biosafety policy in a developing
country: the goal of biosafety policy; the appropriate means of controlling risk; the impact of
biosafety on scientific development and private investments; the impact of biosafety on the
international transfer of technology and international trade; the incidence of biosafety costs; and
the size of biosafety system. 
Keywords: Biosafety, economic aspects, developing countries, agriculture, biotechnology,
research
15 pages.  Research organizations as used in this paper refers to all firms, corporations, laboratories,
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institutes and centers, whether publicly supported or private, national, international or multinational, that
are involved in some aspects of agricultural biotechnology research and development.
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1. Introduction
In many developing countries traditional agriculture and plant breeding programs are
now being supplemented by genetic engineering techniques. These include tissue culture
techniques to produce disease free seedlings, new formulations for animal vaccines and
growth hormones, and more recently the development of transgenic plants.  Biosafety, which
is used here to encompass the policies and procedures adopted by a government to ensure the
safe application of modern biotechnology, is a topic which has generated a wide public
interest in recent years as more and more countries field test transgenic crops developed by
their own national laboratories or international public and private research organizations  (De
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Kathen, 1997).
While a majority of industrialized countries have biosafety regulatory procedures in
place, the situation in developing countries is quite different.  Virgin (1997) points out the
results of a 1995 Biotechnology Advisory Center survey, which indicates that only about ten
percent of the developing countries have any established biosafety regulations.  In the absence
of a clear biosafety regulations and guidelines, countries may not be able to take advantage of
the international transfer of modern biotechnologies.
The role of regulatory issues in the discussion of biotechnology reflects the increasing
awareness of the influence of law on technology, technology on society, and the increasing
pressure for policies that anticipate rather than react to new technology.  There is a growing
body of literature on the safe use of biotechnology and the need for an international biosafety
protocol and national regulations to facilitate the safe development and transfer of
biotechnology.  Most of these studies, however, address the issue of biosafety from a
scientific, legal, environmental and organizational perspective (Lesser and Maloney, 1993;
Persley et al., 1992; OECD, 1992; Persley, 1990; OTA, 1988).  The purpose of this paper is to
add to this discussion by providing an economic perspective on biosafety regulation of
products of agricultural biotechnology. 3
Societies are comprised of a number of regulatory systems.  Regulation involves
choices between alternate rules of the game and between alternate assignments of rights that
are prior to economic analysis.  Thus, a caveat to note is that economics can no more tell us
what biosafety rules and rights structures should be than whether and what agricultural
biotechnologies should exist.  For an economist to aver the substance of biosafety regulations
is equivalent to asserting the rules and rights structures and to reach beyond economic
analysis.  The purpose of this paper, therefore, is to address several economic issues rather
than conduct an economic assessment of biosafety.  In addition to providing a brief discussion
on the economic rationale for biosafety regulations, the three objectives of this paper are to
explain the economic benefits and costs of biosafety, appropriate form of biosafety policy, and
the effects of regulation upon the allocation of resources.  The implications of these issues
discussed in this paper are specially geared towards developing countries who have been
lagging behind in building a biosafety regulatory capacity but are under increasing pressure to
put a biosafety framework in place.  For example, the Convention on Biological Diversity has
recently set-up an international biosafety protocol to facilitate and ensure the establishment of
a biosafety regulatory framework in developing countries (Virgin, 1997).
2.  Biosafety Regulations: The Perspective of Economic Theory
The economics literature contains frequent evaluative assertions to the effect that
regulation per se produces inefficiency or distortions (Samuels, 1981).  In fact, one can
denigrate any law or legal change as inefficient (in the connotation of pareto optimality)
because law is not voluntary adjustment and loss accrues to some former holders of rights. 
Hence, minimum government intervention and regulation have been advocated by political
economists ever since the time of Adam Smith.  Despite this long-held view from the
discipline of economics, regulation, including biosafety, can be economically justified by its
function of managing aspects of the indeterminacy, uncertainty and risk in the regulated
industry.
Two alternative views about the regulation of an industry are widely held in the
literature of economics of regulation.  The first is that regulation is instituted primarily for the
protection and benefit of the public at large or some large subclass of the public.  The second4
view is essentially that the political process defies rational explanation.  In other words, they
are guided by unpredictably shifting mixture of political forces (Stigler, 1971).  The evidence
of active participation by the scientists, biotech companies, consumer groups and policy
makers in the debate about the extent of safety regulations needed for the new biotechnology
products lends support to the view that biosafety regulations are for the protection of either the
industry, consumers, research organizations or the public at large (Crawford, 1990; Schneider,
1993).
Although biotechnology is expected to produce valuable products that will increase
crop yields, reduce chemical and pesticide use or increase the efficiency of agricultural inputs
and outputs, questions have been raised about the possible side effects of biotechnologies in
the form of migration of genetically engineered organisms (GEOs) to other environments and
other deleterious ecological, property and human health effects (Betz et al., 1983).  As a
result, the possibility of harm from the generation of this new technology is an externality
requiring public policies to transfer the costs imposed on the society to the externality
generator.
Biosafety can be viewed as a mechanism for controlling these possible stochastic
externalities generated from agricultural biotechnologies.  Biosafety regulations induce the
externality generator (biotechnology research organizations - public and private) to internalize
the possible costs (discussed in later sections) to be involuntarily imposed on others.  Since,
most of the developing countries do not have a regulatory framework comprehensive enough
to encompass the products of new biotechnologies, investments incurred by the government to
develop a biosafety system can be similarly viewed as inducing the present generation to
internalize the costs involuntarily imposed on future generations.
Thus, from an economic perspective, biosafety represents a mechanism of transferring
the costs of possible "accidents" (externalities) to be incurred by agriculturists (in the form of
increased pest problems, reduced yields), consumers (in the form of health hazards) and the
society at large (in the form of environmental degradation, loss of biodiversity, etc.) to the
research organizations and present generation citizens (whose tax money will be used to
finance the biosafety system).        This assertion for biosafety regulation assumes that the perceived risks of biotechnology are real and
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correctly estimated.  If, however, biosafety policies are based on overestimation of risks (i.e. it regulates
everything and too much), then some of the costs incurred by the society may turn out to be redundant
lending support to the inflationary argument.
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In the economics literature, an argument often made against regulation is that it will
contribute to inflation.  It is true that the immediate impact of biosafety regulations will be an
increase in the production and regulatory costs.  But because of biosafety, the costs borne by
the agriculturists, the consumers and the society are likely to be lowered.  With biosafety, the
costs hitherto borne by a research organization will be imposed on another and passed on as
costs of production to the consumer of the final product.  Note however that the higher price
will cover two products (the physical product and environmental safety) and will substitute for
the price, which will be lower, hitherto borne by the society because of the unsafe
biotechnology products.  If the risks are correctly perceived and biosafety regulations are
directed towards controlling these risks, then the regulation may not necessarily contribute to
inflation.  Biosafety regulation can act as a mode of registering and assigning the costs rather
than their cause; It can be the mean by which interests in conflict is differentially protected.
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3.  The Benefits and Costs of Biosafety
Developing countries in the process of establishing a national biosafety policy to
promote the use of modern agri-biotechnology should be aware of  the costs and benefits of
establishing a regulatory framework.  Economists define benefits as those outcome of an
activity that adds to an objective and costs as those that lessen the objective.  Hence, the
discussion about costs and benefits of biosafety is meaningless without defining an objective
function.  Considering that the objectives of a research organization (private, public, national
and international) will be different from those of the society as a whole, the costs and benefits
of a research organization and the society are discussed separately.6
3.1.  Costs and benefits to a research organization
Assuming that the objective is to maximize the net returns to research, biosafety
represents both time cost and opportunity cost to a research organization.  Biosafety increases
the research lag by postponing the commercial release of biotechnology products (Fleisher,
1989).  Research organizations will have to shoulder the expense of providing needed data
and test results and may delay large-scale testing and marketing of products; thus, reducing the
(discounted) benefits to be generated from new biotechnologies.  Biosafety will increase the
production costs of the research organizations in the form of containment facilities, assembly
of paperwork and laboratory results necessary to submit to the appropriate regulatory agency
for approval of initial field test and other logistic costs.  It may also increase the rejection rate
of research products prior to their commercial release, if the products do not meet the safety
standards.  Thus, the production costs per released product will increase.  Even the marketing
costs (processing, packaging and labeling) of industries using GEOs as an input will increase
depending on the regulatory requirements on product marketing.  Biosafety will also increase
the transaction costs for the research organization in the form of information costs, search
costs and payment of fees, charges, etc.
A well established biosafety system will however, reduce uncertainty and increase the
predictability of expected time and money to get a new product on the market.  As a result it
will encourage investments in biotechnology research by both public and private sector
(Crawford, 1990).  It will also reduce the possible liability costs whivh would be incurred if
the products were to be released without regulatory approval.  This is especially relevant to
research organizations (both foreign and domestic) wanting to enter in the markets of
developing countries.
3.2.  Costs and benefits to the society
The goal of public policy is to maximize the welfare of all its citizens.  Biosafety
regulation helps to achieve this goal by reducing the unknown risks to human and animal
health and the environment.  Also, it provides the certainty and stability to the social
framework, necessary for the development of biotechnology research and development
activities, and then the introduction of products of biotechnology available in a given country.        For example, Szybalske (1985) uses the following argument to unjustify biosafety: "(I) the known
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present and future benefits of genetic engineering are enormous; (ii) the hypothetical, inadvertent risks, if
any, are balanced by the hypothetical inadvertent benefits; and, (iii) the overall cost of unnecessary
regulation is high. Thus, the balance sheet clearly shows that regulations are not justified at present and are
against the best interests of society." (Szybalski,1985, p. 115).
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However, these benefits to the society are not without costs.  For example, setting up a
biosafety system is a costly operation.  It demands human and physical resources that are
scarce in many developing countries.  Also, the society has to incur risk assessment, other
operational and bureaucratic costs of day to day operation of regulatory system.  Thus,
biosafety represents an opportunity cost to the society.  Secondly, although the regulatory
requirements are the same for all organizations producing similar products, the cost of
meeting these requirements will have a proportionately larger claim on the resources of
smaller organizations.  Hence, biosafety may affect the market structure of biotechnology
research industry by driving small organizations out of biotechnology research.
To economically justify a biosafety system, a country will need to assess the potential
benefits and balance them against the costs of regulations.  The arguments found in the
literature for and against biosafety are mostly based on estimates of costs and benefits that are
still hypothetical and speculative in nature.   There is a need for more field research, risk
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assessment, and data collection and analysis to identify the real costs and benefits of biosafety.
Moreover, developing countries need to assess these costs and benefits keeping in perspective
the type and scope of biotechnology research to be undertaken and promoted in the country.
4.  Forms of Biosafety Policy: Implications for Resource Allocation
4.1. Alternate means of controlling risks
The purpose of establishing a biosafety system is to control the possible risks
associated with GEOs.  However, given the uncertainty in the scientific community about risks
of GEOs, public policy makers face a choice between alternative means of controlling risks. 
First of all, they face the choice of whether biosafety guidelines should be imposed as a
“voluntary” or a “legally binding” code of conduct.  If a legally binding system, what form
should it take?  Ex ante regulation of biotechnology products and processes (in the form of
required permits, licenses, regulations, pre-manufacture notification submissions, or product8
approvals), a strict ex post liabilities (in the form of damage payments by the manufacturer) or
a negligence rule (combination of ex ante regulation and ex post liabilities)? (Larson and
Knudson, 1991).  Each of these alternatives has different implications for the resource
allocation decisions and sharing of benefits and burdens of biosafety.
Under an ex ante regulatory standard, a research organization must comply with the
standard - spend a certain amount on "safety" - before conducting an activity.  Thus, the
burdens of biosafety are borne by the research organization and the government a priori of the
occurrence of damages.  The benefits of this approach is that it controls and minimizes the
"accident costs.”  On the other hand, under strict liability for damages, the organization fully
compensates injured parties if an accident occurs and if it can be shown that the organization's
actions caused the damages.  The benefit of this approach is that it minimizes the costs of
biosafety but increases the "accident costs” to be borne by the research organization and the
future generation citizens.  Under a negligence rule, the research organization may not be held
responsible for any damages if it follows stipulated standards or guidelines.  This approach is
a combination of ex ante regulation and ex post liability where by the organization managers
decide on which approach they would like to adopt.
Due to the pressure of consumer groups and environmentalists, the biosafety policy
developed in most industrialized countries emphasize the ex ante regulation approach (Persley
et al., 1992; Lesser and Maloney, 1993).  The major advantage of this approach is that it
provides information to both the producers and consumers of biotechnologies.  For example,
if a research organization produces new products according to the regulations, it is less likely
to be fined ex post.  Thus, regulation and product standards reduce risk (arising from the lack
of predictability concerning how the legal system will respond) and thereby allow the market
to work more smoothly as the participants are more informed about the rules of the game
(Wittman, 1977).  However, if the risks of biotechnologies are overstated, as claimed by Brill
(1985), Davis (1987), Miller (1991) and others, then ex ante regulations pose unnecessary
costs to the society.
Since all types of biotechnology products do not face the same risk profile, it is often
socially advantageous to employ the two means of controlling risks (negligence rule) - i.e.
require research organizations to satisfy a regulatory standard and also to face possible liability9
(Segerson, 1986).  In this case, research organizations producing relatively high risk products
are led to do more than to satisfy the regulatory standard, for their potential liability makes that
worth their while.  In effect, a reduction of the regulatory standard can be afforded because
liability is present to take up some of the "slack" associated with the less stringent standard.  In
theory, this approach will  minimize both the "accident" costs and "accident prevention” costs
to the society.
In practice, the emphasis given to different approaches in developing a biosafety policy
will depend on several factors including, the nature of risks (probability and consequence) of
biotechnologies (which in turn will depend on the type of biotechnology product/process
being promoted in the country -- e.g., GEOs versus tissue culture), goal of public policy
(whether the goal is to minimize the "accident costs" or the sum of "accident" costs and
"accident prevention” costs), institutional and judicial framework, and the involvement of
private sector in biotechnology research.  Simply translating the biosafety regulations of
industrialized countries will not work in developing countries where the existing legal
framework may not be comprehensive enough and the judicial system not strong in enforcing
laws.  In some cases, the establishment of a biosafety framework may entail the establishment
of new legislation and building up of an administrative and law enforcement network.
4.2. Economic issues in designing a national biosafety policy
Although, the costs of biosafety will be ultimately borne by all the sectors of the
society, its immediate cost will be imposed on research organizations.  It is, therefore,
important that biosafety policy makers in developing countries give particular attention to the
impacts on research organizations in designing a biosafety policy.
In countries that have a federal and state government system, such as the United States
and India, a national rather than state-level biosafety policy would be more conducive to
biotechnology research organizations.  Disparate regulations can lead to unseemly and
possibly dangerous competition among states to stage experimental releases on a fee basis
(Lesser and Maloney, 1993).  Harmonization is also important at regional and international        Transfer of crop varieties across political boundaries can be potentially inhibited by two factors - the
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genotype by environment interactions and the social, economic, legal and political framework.   Both direct
and indirect transfer of technology has been an important phenomenon in conventional plant breeding
research not only because of common agro-climatic environment but also due to minimum and harmonized
legal framework (Maredia et al., 1996).  Such international transfers are mutually beneficial to all the
countries and particularly the small countries who do not have the critical mass to engage in a full-fledged
crop improvement program.  Given the high costs of biotechnology research, harmonization of biosafety
regulations is particularly important if these countries want to benefit from biotechnologies developed in
other countries.
        The inability for a country to internationally compete in agricultural commodities and feed the
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increasing population are frequently cited as the projected consequences of overregulation of biotechnology. 
In the U.S., lobbyists have often used the combination of national self-interest and global altruism in
justifying biotechnology.  For example, Monsanto's Senior Vice President for Research and Development,
Howard Schneiderman writes: "Genetic engineering and other new agronomic methods should enable the
American farmer to continue to lead the world in agricultural productivity in the next century and to feed a
significant number of these nine billion people... However unless we keep genetic engineering on a fast
track with research funding, and unless federal regulations permit the controlled field testing of new crop
varieties and beneficial soil microorganisms, America will lose out." (Schneiderman 1985, p.11).
10
levels to promote the international transfer of technologies.   Disparate, excessive or no
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regulations can act as a non-tariff barrier inhibiting trade.
An expanded policy of strict standards and bans would have a negative impact on
technological change and product innovation (Miller, 1991).   Although one of the benefit of
5
biosafety is that it will promote private research and development, too much regulation may
discourage private investments.  One way to speed up adoption, interpretation process and
reduce the uncertainty of investment in biotechnology would be to use, where possible, the
existing legislation rather than develop an entirely new system of rules and laws.
An issue that needs to be addressed in designing biosafety policy is the incidence of
risk assessment and other costs.  Clearly, one of the immediate implications of biosafety is that
it will be a cost increasing policy for both the government and research organizations.  Given
the stringent budgets, governments in developing countries may decide to pass on some of the
burdens (viz. risk assessment) on to the research organization.  This will add to the increasing
costs of biotechnology research programs.  Policy makers should make sure that additional
costs of biosafety, particularly of risk assessment should not adversely affect the productivity
of biotechnology research.11
Another important issue in designing a biosafety system is its size (number of
employees and total investments).  Biosafety is an emerging policy area in developing
countries, and in developing appropriate policies and procedures for the regulation of
biotechnology, a country will have to establish various committees, sub-committees and
regulatory agencies (Persley et al., 1992).  Naturally, these countries will look towards
industrialized countries, which are advanced in biotechnology research, for biosafety
guidelines and system design.  However, for economic justification, the size of a biosafety
system should be congruent with the stage of economic development of the country and the
biotechnology research industry (which is likely to be at initial stages in many developing
countries).  Thus, developing countries should make sure that they do not duplicate the size of
the biosafety system from industrialized countries such as the U.S. but the basic concepts of
the biosafety system.
5.  Conclusions and Implications for Developing Countries
Rapid development in agricultural biotechnology has stimulated both industrial and
developing country governments to develop national programs and policies aimed at realizing
its potential benefits.  An efficient biosafety system is one of the prerequisite for realizing the
potential benefits of biotechnology research.  Thus, in recent years, many international and
national organizations in industrialized countries, such as the OECD, WHO, FAO, UNEP,
USAID, USDA, GTZ, and UNIDO have been involved in assisting developing countries in
developing biosafety guidelines.  In this paper, I discussed the economic aspects of regulations
and outlined various economic issues that developing countries and the various organizations
assisting these countries need to keep in mind while designing an efficient biosafety policy.
From an economic perspective, biosafety can be viewed as a mechanism for
controlling externalities and transferring costs to be incurred by the consumers, farmers and
society to the research organizations and present generation citizens.  The benefits of biosafety
include - the reduction of possible human and environmental risks of biotechnology products
and "accident" costs to the society; increased predictability for a research organization of the
expected time and money to get a new product on the market; making the products of
biotechnology accessible to a country; and the provision of certainty and stability to the social12
framework, necessary for the development of biotechnology research and development
activities.  
Installing a biosafety system to avail these benefits is, however, not an easy task. It
entails establishing national committees, working groups and advisory panels, developing
rules and regulations, getting legislative approval, developing technical manuals, handbooks
and guidelines for research organizations, hiring inspectors, conducting risk assessment tests,
carrying out the day-to-day administration of applications, approvals and complaints,
enforcing biosafety laws, and so on.  A functional legal and administrative infrastructure is
therefore an absolute necessity for establishing a biosafety system in a developing country.
In developing the biosafety guidelines, developing countries should balance the
potential benefits with the tangible costs of biosafety to the research organization and the
society.  To a research organization, biosafety represents both a time and opportunity cost.  It
will increase the research lag, production costs, transaction costs and marketing costs of
biotechnology research organizations.  Moreover, the increased costs of biosafety may drive
out small biotechnology research organizations from the market. Also, given the scarcity of
human and physical resources, setting up a biosafety system also poses opportunity costs to
the society.
As more and more countries come under the increasing pressure for developing a
biosafety framework, the following issues need careful examination in designing a biosafety
policy.
a. The goal of biosafety policy (whether it should be the minimization of only
"accident" costs or the sum of "accident" costs and "accident" prevention
costs?).
b. The appropriate means of controlling risk (ex ante regulation, ex post liability or
a combination of both).
c. The type and functionality of the legal and judicial system in the country.
d. The impact of biosafety on scientific development and private investments.
e. The impact of biosafety on the international transfer of technology and
international trade.13
f. The incidence of biosafety costs (who is going to pay for the creation and
maintainance of a biosafety regulatory system?)
g. The size of biosafety system.
Of course, there are no “blanket recommendations” for developing countries on many of these
issues.  Each country will need to develop a biosafety system based on the development status
of its biotechnology industry (which varies widely across countries in Asia, Africa and Latin
America), types of biotechnology products to be developed or traded (which can range from
simple tools and products of tissue culture and mircropropagation to genetically engineered
crops and plants) and, the overall legal and administrative infrastructure in which the economy
operates.
In conclusion, in designing a biosafety policy, developing countries should emphasize
the safe use of biotechnology rather than imposing unnecessary restrictions on the pretext of
safety in biotechnology.  The latter will only lead to more bureaucracy and less efficiency,
especially, in today’s climate of shrinking resources for agricultural research.  The growing
pressure for developing biosafety regulations should not lead to the elephantiasis of biosafety
system and atrophy of biotechnology research.
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